


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
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
R ——— L H ——— S S

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P ——— s D ——— g ——— r of W ———.



[Price One Shilling and Six Pence.]



L E T T E R

T O

H E R R———L H———S

T H E

P—s D—w—g—r of W—

On the A P P R O A C H I N G

P E A C E.

With a few Words concerning the

Right Honourable the E A R L of B—,

A N D T H E

General Talk of the W O R L D.

*'Tis a Busy talking World, and with licentious breath
Blows as freely on the PALACE as the COTTAGE ;
Hence have the Talkers of this pop'lous City
A shameful Tale to tell, for public Sport.* ROWE.

'Tis the privilege of Britons to reprove their Superiors,
ADDISON.

————— *I will Talk,
Tho' Hell itself should from the Center gape,
And bid me hold my Tongue.* SHAKESPEAR.

L O N D O N :

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A
L E T T E R
T O H E R

ROYAL HIGHNESS

The PRINCESS DOWAGER, &c,

M A D A M,

W H E N E V E R I consider the
nature of the British constitu-
tion, or whenever I examine
into the real welfare of my country, I
cannot avoid reflecting in how great a
degree a good Prince must advance
the security of the first, and promote
the happiness of the latter.

B

From

From this consideration, I am naturally led, not only to a review of the past, but into a stricture of the present, and induced to take a comparative view of preceding æras, to form a just estimation of the state of my own.

Whatever retrospect I have made upon former ages, Madam, has been however considerably favourable to this. The history of former reigns is chequered with a variety of circumstances, that reflect no very great honour upon the administration of the Prince, or the stability of the people ; the public distrust that influenced the conduct of the one, and the perpetual jealousy that actuated the behaviour of the other, could not, in the end, be less than prejudicial to the interest of both. The apprehension of the government naturally lessened the confidence of the subject, and the temerity

rity of the subject as naturally lessened the prerogative of the King. In justice, indeed, to the memory of his late most excellent Majesty, it must be observed, that few princes ever lived more generally admired, or died more sincerely lamented. Yet amiable as he was in private life, and respected as he might be in public, his reign was not altogether free from disquiets, nor was his government always attended with that domestic felicity, which he so assiduously laboured to deserve. The conduct of an unpopular minister was, for a long time, productive of much national altercation, and the necessity may yet possibly dwell upon your Royal Highness's memory, which his late Majesty was under of removing him from all his employments, to silence the complaints of the people.

As political observations are, however, but a barren field of entertainment for the ladies, I shall endeavour,

to the utmost of my power, to avoid blending this epistle with those usual remarks which form the customary string of modern politics, and confine myself principally to such matters, as may naturally occur to a lady's own reason, either in times of peace or war, without either loading her memory, or perplexing her imagination.

It is, Madam, a principle immemorially established, that a perfect unanimity between prince and subject, is the best foundation for the happiness of both ; and, indeed, where the greatness of the prince must proceed from the opulence of the subject, it is a little surprising, that this doctrine has not been universally embraced. To the scandal of government, and the disgrace of humanity, the history of EUROPE abounds with many instances, where a false principle of glory, a rage for a scandalous applause, has been

been the only guide of the monarch, and so a reputation, which the meanest of his subjects should blush to think of, was acquired, no matter what became of the prosperity of the people — Hence wars were begun with cause — Destruction let loose without reason — Public discontent was the necessary effect, and the consequence of that discontent, public misfortunes and calamity. — FRANCE has not yet forgot her illustrious destroyer, LEWIS XIV. nor will SWEDEN, for some ages, recover the wounds which she received from the unaccountable phrenzy of her celebrated MADMAN.

To preserve, or, more properly speaking, to arrive at this salutary unanimity, a Prince should be particularly careful in the choice of his ministers, and place the reins of government in no hands, that had not remarkably laboured for the service of their country. — The man
who

who can be an apostate to his country, can never be faithful to his King ; and 'tis an axiom confirmed by long experience, that the man, who has once betrayed the interest of the people, will never stick at any measures to attain the advancement of his own.—A weak or corrupt administration, is frequently reduced to exigencies, from being disagreeable to the public ; and even supposing a bad minister had really the welfare of his Sovereign at heart, yet he is often obliged to endanger it, from the want of that necessary support which can only proceed from the people. This sometimes exposes him to the commencement of a rash war, or the conclusion of a shameful and dishonourable Peace—to an unnecessary disbursement of vast sums, and the wanton effusion of much blood.

Of all the calamities, to which, in the common course of things, a nation

tion

tion is exposed, a war is universally allowed to be the most affecting. For neighbouring kingdoms, whom humanity and benevolence should connect in one common cause, and who should become mutual examples of honesty and justice, to be perpetually employed in spilling each other's blood, and destroying each other's habitations, is a circumstance afflictive to the last degree, in any bosom not totally divested of the faculty to feel ; abstracted from the political consideration, that the greatest success in any war, is nothing more than a negative advantage, and only reducing our neighbours to a worse situation than ourselves.

The exigencies of states must, however, be a melancholy excuse for the necessity of war ; and for the honour of Great Britain be it remembered, that nothing but the most pressing necessity has induced her to draw the sword,

sword, or scourge the perfidious insolence of her enemies.

There is a wide disparity between the private sufferings of subjects and the public injury of states.—The one may overlook an offence without danger; but the smallest palliation in the other, is an attack in the nicest part of the body politic, and striking at the very vitals of the constitution.

It is not in this place to be observed to your Royal Highness, how just a foundation we had for the present war.—That is a truth with which all the powers of *Europe* are perfectly acquainted.—The business of this letter is only to enforce a proper Consideration to the approaching treaty of peace, and to point the necessity of obtaining such terms, as may effectually put it out of the power of our enemies to give us any disturbance for the future.

As

As it may possibly seem a little odd, that your Royal Highness is troubled with any address of this nature, I must urge for excuse, the tender regard you have always shewn for these kingdoms, and the many obligations they owe to your Royal Highness's distinguished excellence and virtue.—To you, under heaven, they are next indebted for the security of their rights and liberties; and to your Royal Highness they owe the first advantages, which render them happy as a people.—Providence has been pleased to bless your Royal Highness with an illustrious offspring, and to make the source of your private felicity the public means of happiness to this nation.—But, tho' these are blessings of the first importance, we are not less indebted to the exemplary care, which your Royal Highness has shewn in forming the rising guardians of our freedom to the nicest sensibility of pa-

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triotism

triotism and virtue ; to a generous regard for the dignity of the crown, and a glorious solicitude for the welfare of the people.

Whenever I reflect upon this delightful subject, Madam, and consider how you have taught,

“ *The opening genius of the Royal Youth,*
 “ *And formed their footsteps to the paths*
 “ *of truth ;*
 “ *Gave each expanding bosom how to beat,*
 “ *With all the princes and the patriots*
 “ *beat ;*
 “ *And nobly raised an emulative fire,*
 “ *To beam with all the glories of its fire,”*

I am naturally led to think your Royal Highness a more proper object of the public address, who have laid it under the highest obligation.

Suffere

Suffer me therefore, Madam, in behalf of that public, who think of your Royal Highness with the justest admiration, to offer a few plain and rational hints upon the prospect of an approaching peace, entirely free from those political perplexities, which generally bewilder the imagination of the reader.

I have already observed to your Royal Highness, the little necessity there is of entering into the motives of the present war, which have already been published to the whole world, and which sufficiently justify the effects of our resentment; I shall therefore decline speaking upon that head, and, agreeable to my first declaration, principally confine myself to the steps which should be taken in consequence of our success.

And first, we are to consider our situation as a maritime power, and our interest

as a commercial nation.—In either light we have every reason to think ourselves the most considerable state in Europe, and in consequence of such a thought, to keep an eye upon our *Importance*, while we hold an attention to our *welfare*. The *reputation* of kingdoms may be justly reckoned a matter of the greatest weight in the scale of government, and 'tis a self-evident truth, that the security of nations is encreased in proportion as they maintain their respect.

This makes their resentment dreaded, their alliance courted, and they become naturally more formidable abroad, as they set a just consideration upon their importance at home.

Of this truth, the annals of Great Britain bear a sufficient testimony. To what a state of poverty and contempt did the ministry of CHARLES the second

cond reduce us, by a scandalous inattention to the dignity of the crown, and an infamous neglect of the welfare of the people. Our trade was destroyed, our colonies torn from our possession with impunity, and our subjects butchered without revenge. The Dutch engrossed all the settlements at Amboyna. Their admiral rode up to our very doors, with all the insolence of triumph, and nearly extinguished every spark of that fire, which in British bosoms might lay a world in ashes.

Sunk in a licentious stupefaction we were scarcely able to make any effort for our remaining rights, or the defence of our expiring freedom. Our citizens were effeminate, our nobility riotous, and our monarch dissolute. The first were impoverished, the second were corrupt, and scandal to the boast of nations, the third was a mercenary dependant upon the bounty, I should have

have said, a voluntary slave to the caprice of an illustrious ruffian *, at once a disgrace to a throne, and a scandal to humanity.

Great a horror as every bosom must entertain for the MURDERER of a KING, yet the very time of the USURPATION was an æra more *nationally* honourable than the interval of so weak or corrupt an administration. For tho' CROMWELL overturned the constitution of his country, yet he maintained her *consequence*; and though he trampled upon her liberties at home, he made her universally respected abroad. Whereas in CHARLES's time we were a scoff to our neighbours, and a reproach to ourselves. We were plunged in the worst of slaveries, the slavery of the soul; and sunk in an indolence and libertinism so scandalously inglorious, that nothing but a miracle could possibly redeem us.

The

* Lewis XIV. of France.

The effects of CHARLES's administration, notwithstanding a succession that does honour to the name of royalty, are not yet totally removed, and it required all the virtues of a BRUNSWIC Family to wake in us that regard which we now entertain for our liberty as BRITONS, and our characters as MEN.

From this cursory retrospect upon a former administration, it is evident, that the security of any kingdom must considerably depend upon that national kind of pride, which preserves it from making improper concessions to foreign states. Abstracted from these prudential cautions, which should be observed in all treaties to prevent any possibility of imposition or deceit, we fight to little purpose, if those advantages, which are gained in war, are to be of no consideration at the settlement of
a Peace ;

a Peace ; and have no great reason to boast of our conquests, if the address of our enemies is to strip us of every benefit attending our successes.

An attention to articles so extremely material, Madam, is, however, the business of an administration, and that man must have either a weak head, or a corrupt heart, by whom they can possibly be neglected. We cannot forget, Madam, with what disagreeable appearances the present war was commenced, and how extremely unpopular some persons then in power rendered themselves by the imbecility of their measures, and the tardiness of their operations. We cannot forget the change of officers, in consequence of the public uneasiness, or the execution of a commander, who was condemned for *not* doing his *utmost* in the service of his country.

While

While these circumstances are *remembered*, Madam, we *must* hope there will be no great occasion for having them *mentioned*. An injudicious conduct in the management of a war, is not more culpable than the conclusion of a disadvantageous Peace; and a minister, by the constitution of Great Britain, is no more above the censure of the laws than the meanest of the people.

A Peace, concluded upon disadvantageous principles, has but a very little prospect of duration, and fraught with whatever benefits it may appear, yet in reality it is no more than skimming over the wound, without abating the virulence of the disorder. We have now no more reason to depend upon the treaties of France than we had at the end of the last war, and I do not know why that maxim, which is so serviceable among individuals,

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should

should not be equally essential for the security of nations.

This maxim is nothing more than that the people, who have once deceived us, should never have it in their power to be perfidious a second time. Notorious for her breach of public faith, France laughs at the preservation of treaties, when they lay any restraint upon her ambition, or appear repugnant to the attainment of that universal empire, for which she has hitherto so unceasingly contended. Whenever she listens to terms of accommodation, we must suppose her strength to be exhausted, and that she only begs a breathing time to recruit the spirit of her designs.

The present juncture is one of those critical opportunities, wherein she is reduced to a necessity of crying out for quarter, wherein she must submit
to

to whatever terms we think proper to stipulate, and unless we lay hold of so favourable a crisis, it is more than probable, we never will have (and, I am sure, we never deserve) another opportunity to humble her effectually, and to secure, not only our own tranquility, but the general Peace of all Europe. There is no dependance to be laid upon the most solemn obligations she enters into, and we have, from a variety of instances, every reason to suppose, she never will part with her intention to encroach upon the rights of her neighbours, till she is totally divested of the power to attempt it. It is considerably better, that we should have a superiority over the French, than be liable to their insults and incroachments; and no sincere lover of his country will, I dare say, be offended, if we are always in a capacity to check any attempts they might be inclined to make upon our proper-

ty — A blow or two would entirely effect this salutary purpose, and the vigorous exertion of our force for a season or two longer, prevent the expence of many millions, and save the lives of many thousands for the future.

Plans of national œconomy are at such a juncture the utmost prodigality, and we only save the expence of one year or two's taxes, to expose the nation to succeeding wars, and to entail endless difficulties upon our posterity.— 'Tis neglecting the visible favour of that Providence, which has blest us with an occasion of securing our own happiness, to make no use of so favourable an opportunity; and let me ask one question, if we are at any time obliged to commence another war with France, what will be the consequence, if we are attended with different success? — Will she have any regard to the *excessive* moderation we may have shewn her, or
treat

treat us with an equal share of lenity?
 — No; 'twould be ridiculous to suppose a circumstance of that nature, and madness to expect it.

When I take the liberty of mentioning a disadvantageous Peace to your Royal Highness, I would be understood to mean, that EVERY Peace is disadvantageous that does not *effectually* provide for our future tranquility. I humbly apprehend, Madam, that such a provision *is*, or at least *ought* to be, the ultimate consideration of every treaty; and allowing this to be the case, as in reality it is, from what has been already premised, the happiness of Great Britain is not perfectly secured, while the French are left in *any* capacity to disturb us.

Distress is the only medicine that can be prescribed for the cure of pride, and nothing but severity can possibly
 bring

bring the French to a proper knowledge of themselves, or a real concern for those calamities which their ambition has so frequently occasioned in Europe.—The easiness of an English ministry, not to give it a harsher appellation, has often given the French a sufficient cause of exultation; and their statesman have more than once positively declared, that whatever they had lost during a war with Great Britain, they were sure of gaining from her inattention at the conclusion of a Peace.—'Tis now high time we should remove so sarcastic, not to say contemptuous a reflection upon our understandings, and high time that France should be made to feel the consequence of her perfidy, and deprived of all ability to endanger that general repose, which she has hitherto so greatly delighted to disturb.

But if no terms of accommodation are proper for Great Britain to allow, but
such

such as give her a considerable superiority over France, how much to be dreaded are those propositions, which visibly lessen that superiority, and put the French upon rather more than an equality with ourselves?—How much to be rejected are any terms, that put it again in the power of our enemies to cope with us, and possibly enable them to do something more?—To what purpose have we conquered, if our conquest should be restored? and to what purpose do we conclude a treaty of Peace, with a perfidious enemy, if we put it in the power of that enemy to break it at discretion?

Should the French settlements be restored, they will actually be the least sufferers by the present war.—Secured by favourable capitulations, the principal inhabitants of their colonies either retired to Old France with their treasures, or continued in the possession of
their

their property unmolested and undisturbed. It cost us prodigious sums of money and many thousand brave lives, to make these acquisitions; and the principal advantage they produced us was barely negative, in destroying the trade of our enemies.

We have yet reaped little or no commercial profits from the possession of the French plantations, and the consequence of returning them must only be, that in a short time our enemies will recover themselves from the losses they have sustained, and the only reimbursement that we shall be able to obtain, will be the idle reputation of conquering so many valuable settlements, and the character of madness or stupidity in giving them up.

We have been too long ridiculously brave and prodigally generous.—We have been too long more attentive to the interest of other nations than mindful

ful of the welfare of our own.—France is our most dangerous as well as our most implacable enemy,—She has long looked with an eye of envy upon the encreasing opulence of this kingdom, and constantly endeavoured, by the most insidious behaviour, to destroy it. To obtain her sinister designs, what measures has she stopped at ? what steps has she left untried ? Have not the most solemn obligations been cancelled ? Have not the most sacred treaties been broken ? Have not the bands of public faith, made before the face of all the world, and registered in the sight of God, been scandalously violated ? What then are we to expect from such a people ? The answer to this question is too obvious, and must fill every Englishman with the utmost concern and regret.

Hitherto we have considered ENGLAND, rather as a formidable power than a commercial nation. We shall, therefore, make a few reflections upon
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our trade, and endeavour to point out how that maybe affected upon a supposition, that the terms of the French were complied with at the ensuing negociation.

And here it is scarcely to be observed, that the opulence of Great Britain is principally the consequence of her trade, or that her power almost wholly depends upon the intimacy of her connections with other nations. From the universality of her commerce, her greatness takes its rise, and as that trade is affected it must follow, that the consequence as a nation must be proportionably lessened.

From a conviction of this truth, the French have constantly endeavoured to make every encroachment they possibly could upon our American settlements, and took all opportunities of excluding us from the general run of the European markets, and this they are much
more

more easily enabled to effect from a similitude of religion, a parity of manners ; a vicinity, an actual neighbourhood of intercourse and navigation abstracted from a still more material circumstance, which is, that their commodities are much cheaper than ours, and rather more pleasing to the eye of the purchaser.

This last circumstance of underselling in foreign markets, we have in reality no title to be offended with, but it is our business by all means to prevent it, and this we now have entirely in our power from the possession of those colonies, from which they were supplied with the most necessary articles of their merchandize, and this we have an indisputable claim to do, as well from the law of justice, as the law of nations, as well in vindication of our property, as in resentment of our wrongs.

These are motives in themselves sufficiently powerful to excite a vigorous opposition to every proposal the French are inclinable to offer, and alone of consequence enough to make us deaf to any treaty, but such as from the crushing of their power may carry something of a lasting appearance, and have a real tendency to the security of that welfare, which we have hitherto so steadfastly laboured to preserve.

By the alliance with Spain, France is now to be considered, in point of commerce, as doubly dangerous to the trade of Great Britain. The Family Compact, entered into by these nations, is, in its nature, of the most prejudicial tendency to this kingdom, and calculated to reduce our strength as a formidable power, and our interest as a trading people.

For

For if, by the possession of the American islands, they are able to undersell us at foreign markets, we are deprived of the advantages arising from the very nature of colonies, and totally excluded from any traffic of consequence with the continent, the interest of our enemies must be established in Italy, Turkey, Portugal, Germany, Poland, and Russia. In time, they will be able to engross all the commerce of the Levant; and should the Family Compact still continue, there is more than a bare probability that France and Spain may join in a naval force that would entirely prevent a passage to the Straights, in spite of our utmost efforts to effect it.

Happily hitherto the arm of that Being, who still protects a just cause, has been remarkably distinguished in our favour. The God of battles has taken part with the injured, and rendered

dered the machination of their enemies abortive. — But if we conclude any Peace with the French, that puts them again in possession of their American plantations, that gives them the smallest settlement on the Newfoundland fishing coast, or restores their African and East-India colonies, they will be able to undersell us in our own very markets, from the prodigious extension of their trade, and in time we may look for no English vessels upon the River THAME, but Newcastle colliers, and the lightermen of Rotherhithe.

Here it may be asked, if it is in the power of Great Britain to keep all these settlements in her own possession? To this a simple question may very well serve for answer. — Is it now in the power of our enemies to take them from us? — No; but in time it will — How so? — Won't the addition of these colonies encrease the power of
Great

Great Britain; and won't the loss of them as visibly lessen the opulence of France?—What room can we possibly have for any apprehension of this nature, or what foundation can we have to suppose, that the poverty of our enemies, and the encrease of our own greatness, can ever be a source of new calamities, or plunge us in the difficulties of another war?

The home or domestic manufactures of France can never enable them to carry on a war with Great Britain; her opulence, like our own, principally springs from the foreign trade she carries on from her colonies.—This foreign trade is an inexhaustible source of wealth, and that wealth keeps her constantly restless and turbulent; but this channel of her greatness once stopped up, the effect must necessarily cease with the cause, and she can no more attempt to invade

invade the possessions of Great Britain, when she is totally deprived of the ability.

Some cold-blooded politicians may possibly remark in this place, that keeping ALL the possessions which we have taken from the French, is a circumstance without a precedent.—For God's sake let us make a precedent of it now. —'Tis high time we should begin—Had the last war been vigorously pushed, we should have had little occasion for the commencement of the present one.—The truth of all the observations in the course of this epistle, has been sufficiently proved by this very circumstance.—The moment the French had it in their power to attack us, the moment they had recovered from the expences and loss of the late war, they began to shew the natural turbulence and ambition of their temper!—Nay, even at the very time their agent was pro-

proposing terms of accommodation to our court last winter, was not his master at the same moment carrying on an underhand connection with the king of Spain, and using every possible method to destroy our interest with one hand, while he carried proposals for a general pacification in the other ?

But the perfidy and unbounded ambition of the French nation are too universally known to be at all dwelt upon — the only business of a British ministry is to avoid being made a dupe to the pretences of the first, or a tool to the threats of the latter ; the grand principle for the system of English politics is, to give France no quarter, till we have entirely destroyed the least possibility of her resentment ; and this principle is of so great a consequence, that it must frequently be urged, and plead its necessity for a frequency of the repetition.

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Hav-

Having thus taken a cursory view, Madam, of the fatal consequences which may be apprehended to our trade, if we were to give up the conquests we have made in America, we must observe, that it is still more dangerous for us to allow the French any settlement in our own islands, (if we may call those islands our own of which they have dispossessed us) in Newfoundland particularly, nothing can be more opposite to the interest of Great Britain, than to allow them the smallest footing; for if they are naturally fond of engrossing those places to themselves, with which they have in fact little or no connexion, we can't but suppose they would make use of every means to encroach upon that part of our property, with which in reality they have.

Articles of limitation or agreements to employ but a stated number of vessels, is
at

at best but a precarious dependance, for their behaviour——We have already observed how little a regard they pay to the most solemn engagements, and we cannot expect any great instances of their justice or public faith in this respect, when we give them so fair an opportunity for the breach of both.

Our settlement at Newfoundland (I mean when it is recovered) is one of the most valuable of our American plantations, a continued mine of riches to the nation, and a perpetual nursery of seamen for our defence; but to expatiate on the value of this island, is only to aggravate our concern for its loss—Reverses of fortune all nations have at sometime experienced, and we have no reason to think ourselves exempted from vicissitudes of this nature, more than any other people.

One consolation however remains to mitigate our concern for so valuable a part of the British dominions, and that is the little reason our enemies have to boast of their heroism in obtaining the possession.—The victorious arms of Britain still remain unconquered.—The French were afraid to face us where we had any force, and therefore pitifully stole an army of fifteen hundred men, where we had scarcely a body of fifty to oppose them—some people indeed may be foolish enough to suppose 'tis so much the worse, since the enemy paid nothing for the conquest; but for my own part, I am comforted in the reflecting, that the loss of Newfoundland was not the consequence of the French bravery, but the mere effect of our own inattention.

Flattered, however, with an assurance that it would be speedily reconquered,

quered, we shewed no great signs of dissatisfaction at the loss, but laid dependance enough upon that assurance to look out for the event that has not happened, nor indeed could it; but, I dare say, every lover of his country would be considerably better pleased with recovering the whole with the sword, than a simple part by a lifeless negotiation.

It is not the intention of this epistle to enquire, to whose neglect we are to lay the loss of Newfoundland, but if the loss of that place should be the means of precipitating us into a rash Peace, or if that neglect should be anywise detrimental to the terms of pacification we had a right to expect, a BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS will scarcely be silent on the occasion, or sit down without making some observations on so affecting a misfortune, and so national a disgrace.

The

The principal argument, which is urged by the advocates for a hasty Peace, is the very great burthen we labour under in a national debt, and impossibility of removing it, if we continue the war. A Peace, upon any terms that are not visibly advantageous, is but a miserable expedient to lessen this national debt; for supposing our taxes were removed for two or three years, yet we may soon expect they will be renewed for fourteen or fifteen, if the French are left in any capacity to attack us. Another war must be quickly looked for, and possibly may not be attended with the success, which we have experienced in this, whereas a vigorous continuation of the present, will, in all probability, reduce our enemies to an utter incapability of offending us for the future.

But

But since we have spoke of the national debt, there seems to be a necessity for one enquiry, which is, to whom this national debt is owing? Upon the highest calculation, it does not exceed 140 millions. The sum is undoubtedly prodigious; but, when it is recollected, that, at least, three fourths of it is owing to ourselves, our surprize and apprehension must be greatly lessened, and the formidable bugbear of a national bankruptcy entirely removed. Do our parliamentary supplies wear either the appearance of poverty or distrust? Not at all. The nation has undoubtedly been at great expence, but it is willing to go to considerably more, and prodigious as the sums are, which have already been disbursed, we yet have no inclination to withdraw our hands, while we are convinced, that a continuation of our liberality is applied

ed towards crushing the power of our enemies, and enhancing the greatness of our own.

Was there indeed a possibility to be totally divested of continental connexions, the forces of France could be only employed in *defensive* operations; for while we maintained our superiority at sea, there would be nothing left for them to attack.

It may, however, be observed, that could our troops be recalled from Germany, the force which France employs in that place against us would be entirely useless, and that the French must consequently turn that force against some of the British dominions;—But would not the very army which we keep there be as usefully employed in repulsing it? would not the annual saving of so many millions, considerably add to our principal dependance, the strength of our navies; or if even the British troops only

ly in Germany were to be employed in our fleets, with our present superiority, we should have it in our power to baffle the utmost exertion of all the French maritime opposition, should they even reinforce it with [their power in that quarter, and be supplied with the confederate assistance of their allies.

But the propriety and impropriety, the use and inconvenience of continental connexions being long ago elaborately discussed, there is no great occasion of dwelling upon that subject in this place; tho' one observation must appear pretty obvious, and that is the impolitic conduct of both Great Britain and France in the prosecution of a German war, when neither can possibly be a gainer by the event, in maintaining a large army, and disbursing large sums without any prospect of the most distant benefit, but the most absolute certainty of a considerable loss.

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Indeed,

Indeed, if there is any excuse for the conduct of either in this respect, we have it intirely on our side. A regard for the protestant religion, and a laudable view of preserving the ballance of power in Europe, were some grounds for our taking part with a prince, with whom in reality we could have but little political connexion.

I am well aware, that when I say we could have but little political connexion with the continent, that some sage snuff-taking coffee-house politician, with a consequential gravity, and significant distention of nostril, will be apt to exclaim.—What ! is it not the business of Great Britain to preserve the ballance of power in Europe ?—What ballance of power, my dear Sir ?—Are not Prussia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Russia, Holland, Portugal, Switzerland, Sardinia, Venice, Genoa, Naples, and the

the Papacy, able to preserve a ballance against the houses of Bourbon and Austria—without our troubling ourselves with the matter?—We can't be affected, as I see, by any continental altercations, if we suppose every nation to have the least regard for it's own welfare——and if other states are remiss in their own concerns, must we perpetually be wasting our treasures, and spending our blood to set them right?

To preserve the ballance of power in Europe is a phrase that carries a great deal of pomp, and has pretty effect enough upon the ear; but when it is considered how little we have to do with other peoples business, I fancy any sensible man would be every whit as well pleased if we paid a greater attention to our own.

I would not from this be understood to mean, that the treaty with his Prus-

fian majesty should not be inviolably preserved.—On the contrary ; I look upon civil security to be totally at an end, if there is any breach made in public faith.—Were we to break our treaty with his Prussian Majesty, with what face of reason could we blame the perfidy of France, or how could we justify ourselves for taking up arms to revenge a behaviour, which our own practice had so evidently approved ?

But tho' I set so high a regard upon the purity of public faith, yet it were well, if in our next alliance we were actuated by a spirit of more prudence and less generosity ; it were well if we concerned ourselves in no matters, but what immediately affected our honour and interest, and that we left the continental powers to decide their own differences among themselves.

But

But to return : Among the many instances which we might have given of the French, I should have said, of the Bourbon ambition and perfidy, the unjustifiable attack upon the dominions of his most faithful majesty should not be forgotten ; in public opposition to reason and justice, in open violation to the laws of nations to make war upon a peaceable prince, to invade his dominions, and distress his people, when they were but just recovering from a series of general calamity, just beginning to rise from the ruins of their country, and just tasting the returning mercy of that Providence which had thought proper to afflict them ; at such time, without any colourable pretence, without any appearance of reason, instead of affording that assistance to their misfortunes, which was due from the principles of common humanity, or which might be expected from the
ties

ties of blood. At such a time to attack them, and upon such motives, is a circumstance equally cruel as unjust, and such as must brand the names of the invaders, I might have said with justice, the royal ruffians, the scepter-ed robbers, with everlasting infamy and disgrace.

Fraught with a tender concern for their own welfare, and stimulated by a laudable desire of scourging these illustrious spoilers, the people of Great Britain would sensibly regret any conclusion of a Peace, that gave her inveterate enemy the least probability of ever renewing her ambitious operations. From such a disposition the enemies of the present m——y have taken an opportunity of inflaming the minds of the people, and of reflecting upon the character of a certain noble personage, who presides at one of the first boards in the kingdom. They have insolently

ly supposed, that by his concurrence and advice that all our valuable conquests were to be restored the French, to be allowed a settlement upon our islands, and our allies to be deserted. They have dared to depreciate his understanding, and to vilify his character, and presumed, in a most scandalous manner, to publish a variety of pieces highly disgraceful to the place of his birth, and tending to lessen that mutual confidence, which is the security of the two nations. What have they not dared to insinuate, without regard to birth, without consideration of rank, without respect to justice. But calumny and reproach are frequently the reward of extraordinary merit and virtue, and the more exalted the station, the more apt envious minds are to censure and condemn. In the language of my motto :

'Tis

'Tis a busy talking world, and with licentious breath

Blows as freely on the palace as on the cottage.

No rank, or situation, can exempt us from the popular odium, and it is sometimes a debt, which great minds are obliged to pay for any extraordinary refinement in their sentiments.

The privilege of an Englishman in speaking his mind upon public occasions, is undoubtedly a very great benefit in our constitution, yet I have lately seen it carried to lengths so extremely illiberal, as to wish for some little restriction in the manner. Writers may reason without scurrility, and argue without ill manners, and it is something very hard, that a peer of the realm, and a counsellor to the king, is perpetually exposed to the wantonness
and

and malevolence of every little scribler, who chooses to deliver his opinion upon the affairs of the kingdom, and who pleads the privilege of a free-born Englishman for his licentiousness and abuse; there should be some difference made between the privilege of the press and the insolence; and some distinction between the wantonness of freedom, and the indulgence of liberty.

Unless some regulation of this nature is established, no characters can be safe. Some insignificant monthly or critical reviewer, some occasional understrapper in periodical dulness and invective may, at all times, when the bookseller strikes out a fortunate title, write a whole nation into broils, and yet preserve so happy an ambiguity of phraseology, and so seasonably interlard his performance with asterisks and dashes, as to bid an open defiance to all sense of shame, express an absolute contempt for the laws, and think with

the coolest unconcern upon the resentment of justice, and the scandal of the pillory.

Amiable as the nobleman I speak of is in private life, and deservedly admired, as he must be, in public, yet how scandalously has he been treated by some illiberal pretenders to decency and understanding, his affection to his Sovereign has been called a cloak to his ambition, and the effects of his prudence the result of his parsimony. Motives have been assigned for his conduct, which he never thought of, and reasons for his actions of which he never dreamt. He has been talked of as wholly divested of principle and understanding, as betraying the interest of his P——e, and sacrificing the welfare of his country.

Heavy accusation ! And what is the foundation of all these complaints ?—
Why nothing more or less, than his
lordship's

lordship's being unfortunately born the other side the Tweed, and honoured with a royal confidence, which he has been found to deserve.

Other people generally form their notions from the appearance of circumstances, but the good people of Great Britain are too sensible to wait for any appearances at all. Naturally inclined to be out of humour, they look upon every person, as a friend to his country, that talks about its ruin, or consults the unaccountable acidity of their humour.

Hence fretted by what some interested scriblers have told them about the impropriety of a Scotchman's being in power ; they are dubious of his abilities and integrity, and embrace every opportunity, with an eagerness of satisfaction, that is in the least calculated to prejudice his reputation.

Conscious of this aptitude to be displeased, the same set of public spirited gentry have alarmed us with a fear, that the terms of the ensuing negotiation will be highly disadvantageous, and that we are going to make some concessions to the court of Versailles, which are both dishonourably prejudicial and destructively absurd.

These political writers have been content to form imaginary terms, and never troubled themselves with a consideration, whether they were guided by reason, or founded upon probability.— Stimulated by their prejudice, they were regardless how much they erred; and, in the height of their animosity to Lord B—, have given us some articles, to which the most credulous of his enemies can scarcely give any credit or belief.— They have been weak enough to
say,

say, our conquests were all to be returned ; and, in short, that after a chain of the most glorious successes that ever distinguished any war, we were going to conclude a Peace, upon terms the most ridiculous and absurd.

- We have endeavoured to shew, during the course of this epistle, what measures are proper to be pursued with regard to a treaty of pacification ; and these we have not laid down from a presumptuous supposition that they had not been properly considered by the M——y, but principally to satisfy the enquiries of the people, what steps should be taken in so important an affair, and by that information remove their uneasiness, since they must hope that from the common prudence of any M——y they would be stedfastly pursued.

We

We are now to pay no compliment to a people, who never shewed any esteem for us.—French politeness should never get the ascendancy of British understanding.—Nor should we purchase an encomium from any nation, at so dear a price as our security and welfare.

Let us consider, if the French are inclinable to a Peace, 'tis for their own sakes, and as they consult no interest but their own, I see no reason why they should exceed us in prudence and discretion, especially as we are in a capacity to make the terms perfectly agreeable to ourselves.

Let not a false notion, that we shall be always invincible, and have it in our power to chastise the perfidy of our enemies, render us inattentive to our interest.

terest.—'Tis more adviseable to preserve a superiority, than to contend for one. The ineffectuality of former treaties should convince us of so necessary a truth, and put us wisely on our guard in the present one.—In short, our M—y should take notice of these two lines in an old ballad, if they would prove a just concern for the welfare of the kingdom and their own :

Learn to be wise by other's harms,
And you shall do full well.

Where the interest of people are so immediately concerned, 'tis but natural to expect they *will* talk ; and should any unsuspecting easiness on our side of the question give way to the political plausibilities of a French negotiation, 'tis impossible to say where the consequence will stop.—For if, upon the bare supposition that the terms are to be favourable to France, some interested writers ridicule the abilities of the
M—y

M——y, and *have a shameful tale to tell* of an apprehended Peace ; if *the talkers of this populous city* have now the address to work upon your fears, and render us publickly unhappy, by the bare idea of a disadvantageous accomodation, how much more would they have it in their power to inflame the nation, should there be any foundation for their argument ?

Public harmony is the basis of public security, and the wheels of government must be materially retarded, if the least fracture should happen to the great axis upon which they turn, the affection of the people.—The satisfaction of the kingdom is the highest eulogium that can be made on any administration—and no one can ever dispute the wisdom or integrity of a minister, while the people are contented.

From

From our amazing success in the prosecution of the war, we are naturally led to look for a *most* advantageous and honourable Peace; with this agreeable idea we have long flattered our imagination, and the more we delighted ourselves with such an expectation, the more we must be affected, should we unhappily be disappointed in our hopes.

I have little more to add in this Epistle to your Royal Highness, but a repetition of my former excuse for any seeming impropriety in the freedom of such an address. For my own part, I am entirely satisfied about the ensuing Peace; and perfectly convinced, that members of the administration will omit no opportunity of promoting the welfare of their King, and the interest of their Country.

Sensible that persons of distinguished rank and abilities, who are acquainted with the most secret springs of our own government, and clearly versed in the political constitution of other nations, must be as good judges of the true happiness of Great Britain, as our modern dabblers in public affairs. I readily submit the means of prosecuting that happiness to their superior wisdom, and must honestly confess, I never suspect any person's integrity, till positive facts give me tolerable reason.

I have no notion, that because a person may be a nobleman, he must not be honest; or that being born a hundred miles from the place of my own nativity, can occasion a depravity of manners, or a corruptness of heart. Worth is not confined to kingdoms, or excellence to countries.

Some

“ *Some native spark of heavenly fire confest,*
“ *Glow's to divine, within the Indians breast ;*
“ *Swells unconfin'd from Britain to the pole,*
“ *Expands the genius, and exalts the soul !*
“ *While every clime by subtlety's trepannings,*
“ *Has Bottle Conjurers, and Betsey Cannings !*
“ *Peculiar follies mark'd on every coast,*
“ *A human rabbit, or a Cock-Lane ghost.*

Praying with the deepest fervency for
the happiness of your Royal Highness,
and all your illustrious family, I beg
leave to subscribe myself, with the most
respectful veneration,

M A D A M,

Your devoted and obedient

humble Servant,

AN ENGLISHMAN.

F I N I S.

The first of these is the fact that the
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 The second is that the number of the series
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